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THE METHOD OF FORCING
JUSTIN TATCH MOORE
Abstract. The purpose of this article is to give a presentation of the method
of forcing aimed at someone with a minimal knowledge of set theory and logic.
The emphasis will be on how the method can be used to prove theorems in
ZFC.
1. Introduction
Let us begin with two thought experiments. First consider the following “para-
dox” in probability: if Z is a continuous random variable, then for any possible
outcome z in R, the event Z 6= z occurs almost surely (i.e. with probability 1).
How does one reconcile this with the fact that, in a truly random outcome, every
event having probability 1 should occur? Recasting this in more formal language
we have that, “for all z ∈ R, almost surely Z 6= z”, while “almost surely there
exists a z ∈ R, Z = z.”
Next suppose that, for some index set I, (Zi : i ∈ I) is a family of independent
continuous random variables. It is a trivial matter that for each pair i 6= j, the
inequality Zi 6= Zj holds with probability 1. For large index sets I, however,
|{Zi : i ∈ I}| = |I|
holds with probability 0; in fact this event contains no outcomes if I is larger in
cardinality than R. In terms of the formal logic, we have that, “for all i 6= j in I,
almost surely the event Zi 6= Zj occurs”, while “almost surely it is false that for all
i 6= j ∈ I, the event Zi 6= Zj occurs”.
It is natural to ask whether it is possible to revise the notion of almost surely so
that its meaning remains unchanged for simple logical assertions such as Zi 6= Zj
but such that it commutes with quantification. For instance one might reasonably
ask that, in the second example, |{Zi : i ∈ I}| = |I| should occur almost surely
regardless of the cardinality of the index set. Such a formalism would describe
truth in a necessarily larger model of mathematics, one in which there are new
outcomes to the random experiment which did not exist before the experiment was
performed.
The method of forcing, which was introduced by Paul Cohen to establish the
independence of the Continuum Hypothesis [5] and put into its current form by
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Scott [22] and Solovay [25], addresses issues precisely of this kind. From a modern
perspective, forcing provides a formalism for examining what occurs almost surely
not only in probability spaces but also in a much more general setting than what is
provided by our conventional notion of randomness. Forcing has proved extremely
useful in developing and understanding of models of set theory and in determining
what can and cannot be proved within the standard axiomatization of mathematics
(which we will take to be ZFC). In fact it is a heuristic of modern set theory that if
a statement arises naturally in mathematics and is consistent, then its consistency
can be established using forcing, possibly starting from a large cardinal hypothesis.
The focus of this article, however, is of a different nature: the aim is to demon-
strate how the method of forcing can be used to prove theorems as opposed to
establish consistency results. Forcing itself concerns the study of adding generic
objects to a model of set theory, resulting in a larger model of set theory. One of
the key aspects of forcing is that it provides a formalism for studying what hap-
pens almost surely as the result of introducing a generic object. An analysis of this
formalism sometimes leads to new results concerning the original model itself —
results which are in fact independent of the model entirely. This can be likened to
how the probabilistic method is used in finite combinatorics in settings where more
constructive methods fail (see, e.g., [1]).
In what follows, we will examine several examples of how forcing can be used to
prove theorems. Admittedly there are relatively few examples of such applications
thus far. It is my hope that by reaching out to a broader audience, this article will
inspire more innovative uses of forcing in the future.
Even though the goals and examples are somewhat unconventional, the forcings
themselves and the development of the theory are much the same as one would
encounter in a more standard treatment of forcing. The article will only assume a
minimal knowledge of set theory and logic, similar to what a graduate or advanced
undergraduate student might encounter in their core curriculum. In particular, no
prior exposure to forcing will be assumed.
The topics which will be covered include the following: genericity, names, the
forcing relation, absoluteness, the countable chain condition, countable closure, and
homogeneity arguments. These concepts will be put to use though several case
studies:
(1) partition theorems of Galvin, Nash-Williams, and Prikry for finite and in-
finite subsets of ω;
(2) intersection properties of uncountable families of events in a probability
space;
(3) a partition theorem of Halpern and La¨uchli for products of finitely branch-
ing trees;
(4) a property of marker sequences for Bernoulli shifts;
(5) Todorcevic’s analysis of Rosenthal compacta.
Sections marked with a ‘*’ will not be needed for later sections.
While we will generally avoid proving consistency results, the temptation to es-
tablish the consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation along the
way is too great — this will be for free given what needs to be developed. For
those interested in supplementing the material in this article with a more conven-
tional approach to forcing, Kunen’s [16] is widely considered to be the standard
treatment. It also provides a complete introduction to combinatorial set theory
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and independence results; the reader looking for further background on set theory
is referred there. See also [12], [22], [24], [25], [31]. The last section contains a list
of additional suggestions for further reading.
This exposition grew out of a set of lecture notes prepared for workshop 13w5026
on “Axiomatic approaches to forcing techniques in set theory” at the Banff Inter-
national Research Station in November 2013. None of the results presented below
are my own. I’ll finish by saying that this project was inspired by countless conver-
sations with Stevo Todorcevic over the years, starting with my time as his student
in the 1990s.
2. Preliminaries
Before beginning, we will fix some conventions and review some of the basic
concepts from set theory which will be needed. Further reading and background
can be found in [16]. A set x is transitive if whenever z ∈ y and y ∈ x, then z ∈ x.
Equivalently, x is transitive if and only if every element of x is also a subset of x.
An ordinal is a set α which is transitive and wellordered by ∈. It is readily checked
that every element of an ordinal is also an ordinal. Every wellorder is isomorphic
to an ordinal; moreover this ordinal and the isomorphism are unique. If α and β
are two ordinals, then exactly one of the following is true: α ∈ β, β ∈ α, or α = β.
We will often write α < β to denote α ∈ β if α and β are ordinals.
Notice that an ordinal is the set of ordinals smaller than it. The least ordinal
is the emptyset, which is denoted 0. If α is an ordinal, then α + 1 is the least
ordinal greater than α; this coincides with the set α ∪ {α}. The finite ordinals
therefore coincide with the nonnegative integers: n := {0, . . . , n − 1}. The least
infinite ordinal is ω := {0, 1, . . .}, which coincides with the set of natural numbers.
We will adopt the convention that the set N of natural numbers does not include
0. Unless otherwise specified, i, j, k, l,m, n will be used to denote finite ordinals.
An ordinal κ is a cardinal if whenever α < κ, |α| < |κ|. If α is an ordinal which
is not a successor, then we say that α is a limit ordinal. In this case, the cofinality
of α is the minimum cardinality of a cofinal subset of α. A cardinal κ is regular if
its cofinality is κ. The regularity of a cardinal κ is equivalent to the assertion that
if κ is partitioned into fewer than κ sets, then one of these sets has cardinality κ.
If κ is a cardinal, then κ+ denotes the least cardinal greater than κ. Cardinals of
the form κ+ are called successor cardinals and are always regular.
Since every set can be wellordered, every set has the same cardinality as some
(unique) cardinal; we will adopt the convention that |x| is the cardinal κ such that
|x| = |κ|. If α is an ordinal, then we define ωα to be the αth infinite cardinal. Thus
ω0 := ω and ωβ := supα<β(ωα)
+ if β > 0. The Greek letters α, β, γ, ξ, and η will
be used to refer to ordinals; the letters κ, λ, µ, and θ will be reserved for cardinals.
If A and B are sets, then BA will be used to denote the collection of all functions
from A into B. For us, a function is simply a set of ordered pairs. Thus if B ⊆ C,
then BA ⊆ CA and if f and g are functions, f ⊆ g means that f is a restriction of g.
There is one exception to this notation worth noting. We will follow the custom of
writing ℵα for ωα in situations where the underlying order structure is unimportant
(formally ℵα equals ωα). Arithmetic expressions involving ℵα’s will be used to refer
to the cardinality of the resulting set. For instance 2ω1 is a collection of functions
whose cardinality is 2ℵ1 , which is a cardinal.
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If (X, d) is a metric space, then we define its completion to be the set of equiva-
lence classes of Cauchy sequences, where (xn : n <∞) is equivalent to (yn : n <∞)
if d(xn, yn) → 0. In particular, we will regard the set of real numbers R as being
the completion of the rational numbers Q with the usual metric d(p, q) := |p− q|.
Notice that even if X is complete, the completion is not literally equal to X , even
though it is canonically isometric to X . This will serve as a minor annoyance when
we define names for complete metric spaces in Section 6.
Finally, we will need some notation from first order logic. The language of set
theory is the first order language with a single binary relation ∈. If φ is a formula
in the language of set theory, then φ(v1, . . . , vn) will be used to indicate that every
free variable in φ is vi for some i = 1, . . . , n. If x1, . . . , xn are constants, then
φ(x1, . . . , xn) is the result of simultaneously substituting xi for vi for each i. If φ is
a formula and v is variable and x is a term, then φ[x/v] is the result of substituting
x for every free occurrence of v in φ (of which there may be none). If φ has no free
variables, then we say that φ is a sentence. If every quantifier in φ is of the form
∃x ∈ y or ∀x ∈ y for some variables x and y, then we say that the quantification in
φ is bounded. Many assertions can be expressed using only bounded quantification:
for instance the assertions “A =
⋃
B” and “(Q,≤) is a partially ordered set” are
expressible by formulas with only bounded quantification.
We now recall some foundational results in set theory which justify our emphasis
on transitive models of set theory below. A binary relation R is well founded if
there is no infinite sequence (xn : n <∞) such that xn+1Rxn. A binary relation R
on a set X is extensional if for all x and y in X , {z ∈ X : zRx} = {z ∈ X : zRy}
implies x = y. Among the axioms of ZFC are the assertions that ∈ is well founded
and extensional.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that (X,E) is a binary relation and E is well founded
and extensional. Then (X,E) is uniquely isomorphic to a transitive set equipped
with ∈. In particular, if (X,E) is a model of ZFC and E is well founded, then
(X,E) ≃ (M,∈) for some transitive set M .
Proposition 2.2. If M is a transitive set, φ(v1, . . . , vn) is a first order formula
with only bounded quantification and a1, . . . , an ∈ M , then (M,∈) |= φ(a1, . . . , an)
if and only if φ(a1, . . . , an) is true.
Thus, for example, if M is a transitive set and Q is a partial order in M , then
(M,∈) satisfies that Q is a partial order.
3. What is forcing?
Forcing is the procedure of adjoining to a model M of set theory a new generic
object G in order to create a larger model M [G]. In this context, M is referred to
as the ground model and M [G] is a generic extension of M . For us, the generic
object will always be a new subset of some partially ordered set Q in M , known as
a forcing. This procedure has the following desirable properties:
(6) M [G] is also a model of set theory and is the minimal model of set theory
which has as members all the elements of M and also the generic object G.
(7) The truth of mathematical statements in M [G] can be determined by a
formalism within M , known as the forcing relation, which is completely
specified by Q. The workings of this formalism are purely internal to M .
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While it will generally not concern us in this article, the key meta-mathematical
feature of forcing is that it is often the case that it is easier to determine truth
in the generic extension M [G] than in the ground model M . For instance Cohen
specified the description of a forcing Q with the property that if M [G] is any
generic extension created by forcing with Q, then M [G] necessarily satisfies that
the Continuum Hypothesis is false [5] (see Section 8 below). In fact the second
thought experiment presented at the beginning of the introduction is derived from
a variation of this forcing. It is also not difficult to specify different forcings which
always produce generic extensions satisfying the Continuum Hypothesis (see Section
14 below).
There are two perspectives one can have of forcing: one which is primarily se-
mantic and one which is primarily syntactic. Each has its own advantages and
disadvantages. The semantic approach makes certain properties of the forcing re-
lation and the generic extension intuitive and transparent. On the other hand, it
is fraught with metamathematical issues and philosophical hangups. The syntactic
approach is less intuitive but more elementary and makes certain other features
of forcing constructions more transparent. We will tend to favor the syntactic
approach in what follows. We will now fix some terminology.
Definition 3.1 (forcing). A forcing is a set Q equipped with a transitive reflexive
relation ≤Q which contains a greatest element 1Q. If Q is clear from the context,
the subscripts are usually suppressed.
Our prototypical example of a forcing is R, the collection of all measurable sub-
sets of [0, 1] having positive Lebesgue measure, ordered by containment. Elements
of a forcing are often referred to as conditions and are regarded as being approxi-
mations to a desired generic object. In the analogy with randomness, the conditions
correspond to the events of the probability space which have positive measure. If
q ≤ p, then we sometime say that q is stronger than p or that q extends p. We think
of q as providing a better approximation to the generic object. It will be helpful to
abstract the notion of an outcome in terms of a collection of mutually compatible
events. A set G ⊆ Q is a filter if G is nonempty, upward closed, and downward
directed in Q:
(8) if q is in G, p is in Q and q ≤ p, then p is in G;
(9) if p and q are in G, then there is an r in G such that r ≤ p, q.
If p and q are in Q, then we say that p and q are compatible if there is a r in Q
such that r ≤ p, q. Otherwise we say that p and q are incompatible. Notice that
two conditions are compatible exactly when there is a filter which contains both of
them. Of course two events in R are compatible exactly when they intersect in a
set of positive measure.
A forcing Q is separative if whenever p 6≤ q, there is an r ≤ p such that r and
q are incompatible. Notice that if Q is any forcing, we can define an equivalence
relation ≡ on Q by q ≡ p if
{r ∈ Q : r is compatible with p} = {r ∈ Q : r is compatible with q}.
The quotient is ordered by [q] ≤ [p] if
{r ∈ Q : r is compatible with q} ⊆ {r ∈ Q : r is compatible with p}.
This quotient ordering is separative and is known as the separative quotient. Notice
that if Q is separative, then ≡ is just equality and the quotient ordering is just the
6 JUSTIN TATCH MOORE
usual ordering. The forcing R is not separative; in this example p ≡ q if p and q
differ by a measure 0 set. It is often convenient to assume forcings are separative
and we will often pass to the separative quotient without further mention (just as
one often writes equality of functions in analysis when they really mean equality
modulo a measure 0 set).
The following definition will play a central role in all that follows.
Definition 3.2 (generic). If M is a collection of sets and Q is a forcing, then we
say that a filter G ⊆ Q is M -generic if whenever E ⊆ Q is in M , there is a p ∈ G
which is either in E or is incompatible with every element of E.
A family E of conditions is said to be exhaustive if whenever p is an element
of Q, there is an element q of E which is compatible with p. Notice that if E is a
collection of exhaustive sets and G ⊆ Q is an E-generic filter, then G must intersect
every element of E . Also observe that if S := {{q} : q ∈ Q}, then the S-generic
filters are exactly the ultrafilters — those filters which are maximal.
In order to illustrate the parallel with randomness, take Q = R. Observe that
if E ⊆ R is exhaustive, then its union has full measure. Conversely, if E ⊆ R is
countable and
⋃
E has full measure, then E is exhaustive. Thus in this setting,
genericity is an assertion that certain measure 1 events occur.
There are two other order-theoretic notions closely related to being exhaustive
which it will be useful to define. A family of pairwise incompatible conditions is said
to be an antichain. Notice that this differs from the usual notion of an antichain
in a poset, where antichain would mean pairwise incomparable. Observe that any
maximal antichain is exhaustive but that in general exhaustive families need not
be pairwise incompatible. A family D of conditions is dense if every element of
Q has an extension in D. For example, the collection of all elements of R which
are compact is dense in R. Observe that, by Zorn’s Lemma, every dense set in a
partial order contains a maximal antichain. Two forcings are said to be equivalent
if they have dense suborders which are isomorphic. The reason for this is that such
forcings generate the same generic extensions.
4. A precursor to the forcing relation: a partition theorem of
Galvin and Nash-Williams
In this section, we will prove the following theorem of Galvin and Nash-Williams
which generalizes Ramsey’s theorem. The proof is elementary, but crucially employs
the forcing relation, albeit implicitly. We will also use this partition relation in
Section 15. The presentation in this section follows [30, §5]. If A ⊆ ω, let [A]ω
denote all infinite subsets of A.
Theorem 4.1 (see [8]). If F is a family of nonempty finite subsets of ω, then there
is an infinite subset H of ω such that either:
a. no element of F is a subset of H or
b. every infinite subset of H has an initial segment which is in F .
Notice that Ramsey’s theorem is the special case of this theorem in which all
elements of F have the same cardinality. We will now introduce some terminology
which will be useful in organizing the proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix F as in the
statement of the theorem. If a ⊆ ω, A ⊆ ω with a finite and A infinite, then we
say that A accepts a if whenever B ⊆ A is infinite with max(a) < min(B), then
THE METHOD OF FORCING 7
a ∪B has an initial segment in F . We say that A rejects a if no infinite subset of
A accepts a and that A decides a if it either accepts or rejects A.
We will prove the conclusion of the theorem through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. If A rejects a, then {k ∈ A : A accepts a ∪ {k}} is finite.
Proof. If B := {k ∈ A : A accepts a ∪ {k}} is infinite, then B is an infinite subset
of A which accepts a. 
Lemma 4.3. There is an infinite set H ⊆ ω which decides all of its finite subsets.
Proof. Recursively construct infinite sets ω ⊇ H0 ⊇ H1 ⊇ · · · such that if nk :=
min(Hk) then nk−1 < nk and Hk decides all subsets of {ni : i < k}. It follows that
H := {ni : i <∞} decides all finite subsets of ω. 
Lemma 4.4. If H ⊆ ω is infinite and decides all of its finite subsets, then either
H accepts ∅ or else there is an infinite A ⊆ H which rejects all of its finite subsets.
Proof. IfH rejects the emptyset and decides all of its finite subsets, then recursively
construct n0 < n1 < . . . in H so that for each k, H rejects all subsets of {ni : i < k}.
The choice of the next nk is always possible since
{n : ∃a ⊆ {ni : i < k}(H accepts a ∪ {n})}
is finite. The set A := {ni : i <∞} now rejects all of its finite subsets. 
In order to finish the proof of Theorem 4.1, observe that if H accepts the emp-
tyset, then every infinite subset of H contains an initial segment in F . By the
previous lemmas, it therefore suffices to show that if A is an infinite set which re-
jects all of its finite subsets, then no element of F is a subset of A. If a ∈ F with
a ⊆ A, then B := A \ {0, . . . ,max(a)} would accept a, which is impossible. This
finishes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5. The formalism of the forcing relation
In this section we will develop the forcing relation and the forcing language ax-
iomatically, treating the notion of a Q-name and the forcing relation  as undefined
concepts; the definitions are postponed until Section 6. The advantage of this ap-
proach is that it emphasizes the aspects of the formalism which are actually used
in practice.
Let Q be a forcing, fixed for the duration of the section. As we stated earlier, one
can view Q as providing the collection of events of positive measure with respect to
some abstract notion of randomness. In this analogy, a Q-name would correspond
to a set-valued random variable. It is conventional to denote Q-names by letters
with a “dot” over them.
There are two examples of Q-names which deserve special mention. The first
is the “check name”: for each set x, there is a Q-name xˇ. This corresponds to
a random variable which is constant — it does not depend on the outcome. The
other is the Q-name G˙ for the generic filter; this corresponds to the random variable
representing the outcome of the random experiment.
The forcing language associated to Q is the collection of all first order formulas
in the language of set theory augmented by adding a constant symbol for each
Q-name. If q is in Q and φ is a sentence in the forcing language, then informally
the forcing relation q  φ asserts that if the event corresponding to q occurs, then
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almost surely φ will be true. In the absence of the definitions of “Q-name” and
“,” the following properties can be regarded as axioms which govern the behavior
of these primitive concepts. They can be proved from the definitions of Q-names
and the forcing relation which will be given in Section 6.
Property 1. For any p ∈ Q and any sets x and y:
a. p  xˇ ∈ yˇ if and only if x ∈ y;
b. p  xˇ = yˇ if and only if x = y;
Property 2. For p, q ∈ Q, p  qˇ ∈ G˙ if and only if whenever r ∈ Q is compatible
with p, r is compatible with q.
If Q is separative, then this property takes a simpler form: p  qˇ ∈ G˙ if and
only if p ≤ q.
Property 3. If α˙ is a Q-name, p ∈ Q, and p  α˙ is an ordinal, then there is an
ordinal β such that p  α˙ ∈ βˇ.
It is useful to define the following terminology: if there is a z such that q  y˙ = zˇ,
then we say that q decides y˙ (to be z). Similarly, if p  φ or p  ¬φ, then we say
that p decides φ.
Property 4. For any x, any Q-name y˙, and p ∈ Q, if p  y˙ ∈ xˇ, then there is a
q ≤ p which decides y˙.
Property 5. If x˙ is a Q-name and p ∈ Q, then the collection of all Q-names y˙
such that p  y˙ ∈ x˙ forms a set and the collection of all Q-names y˙ such that
p  y˙ = x˙ forms a set.
Remark 5.1. Unlike the other properties, this one is dependent on the definition of
Q-name which we will give in the next section.
Property 6. If p ∈ Q and φ is a formula in the forcing language, then p  ¬φ if
and only if there is no q ≤ p such that q  φ.
Observe that this property implies that if p  φ and q ≤ p, then q  φ. Property
6 can be seen as providing an organizational tool in the proof of Theorem 4.1: if
Q := ([ω]ω,⊆) then an A ∈ [ω]ω accepts a if and only if A forces that every element
of the generic filter contains an infinite set with an initial part in Fˇ . An infinite A
rejects a if it forces the negation of this assertion.
Property 7. If p ∈ Q, then p  ∃vφ if and only if there is a Q-name x˙ such that
p  φ[x˙/v].
Property 8. For any q ∈ Q, the collection of sentences in the forcing language
which are forced by q contains the ZFC axioms, the axioms of first order logic, and
is closed under modus ponens. Moreover, if the axioms of ZFC are consistent, then
so are the sentences forced by q.
If 1 Q φ, then we will sometimes say that “Q forces φ” or, if Q is clear from
the context, that “φ is forced.” Similarly, we will write “x˙ is a Q-name for...” to
mean “x˙ is a Q-name and Q forces that x˙ is...”.
In order to demonstrate how these properties can be used, we will prove the
following useful propositions.
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Proposition 5.2. Suppose that x is a set and φ(v) is a formula in the forcing
language. If for all y ∈ x, p  φ(yˇ), then p  ∀y ∈ xˇφ(y).
Proof. We will prove the contrapositive. Toward this end, suppose that p does
not force ∀y ∈ xˇφ(y). It follows from Property 6 there is a q ≤ p such that
q  ¬∀y ∈ xˇφ(y). By Property 8, this is equivalent to q  ∃y ∈ xˇ¬φ(y). By
Property 7, there is a Q-name y˙ such that
q  (y˙ ∈ xˇ) ∧ (¬φ(y˙)).
By Property 8 q  y˙ ∈ xˇ and therefore by Property 4, there is a r ≤ q and a z in x
such that r  y˙ = zˇ. But now, by Property 8, r  ¬φ(zˇ) and hence by Property 6
p does not force φ(zˇ). 
Proposition 5.3. Suppose that φ(v1, . . . , vn) is a formula in the language of set
theory with only bounded quantification. If x1, . . . , xn are sets and φ(x1, . . . , xn) is
true, then 1  φ(xˇ1, . . . , xˇn).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of φ. If φ is atomic, then this follows
from Property 1. If φ is a conjunct, disjunct, or a negation, then the proposition fol-
lows from Property 8 and the induction hypothesis. Finally, suppose φ(v1, . . . , vn)
is of the form ∀w ∈ vnψ(v1, . . . , vn, w). If ∀wψ(x1, . . . , xn, w) is true, then for each
w, ψ(x1, . . . , xn, w) is true. By our induction hypothesis, 1  φ(xˇ1, . . . , xˇn, wˇ) for
each w. By Proposition 5.2, it follows that 1  ∀w ∈ xˇnψ(xˇ1, . . . , xˇn, w). 
Proposition 5.4. Suppose that T is a set consisting of finite length sequences,
closed under taking initial segments. If there is a forcing Q and some q ∈ Q forces
“there is an infinite sequence σ, all of whose finite initial parts are in T ,” then such
a sequence σ exists.
Proof. If no such sequence σ exists, then there is a function ρ from T into the
ordinals such that if s is a proper initial segment of t, then ρ(t) ∈ ρ(s). Such
a ρ certifies the nonexistence of such a σ since such a σ would define a strictly
decreasing infinite sequence of ordinals. Observe that the assertion that ρ is a
strictly decreasing map from T into the ordinals is a statement about ρ and T
involving only bounded quantification. By Proposition 5.3, this statement is forced
by every forcing Q. 
There is a special class of forcings for which there is a more conceptual picture
of the forcing relation. We begin by stating a general fact about forcings.
Theorem 5.5. For every forcing Q, Q is isomorphic to a dense suborder of the
positive elements of a complete Boolean algebra.
Here we recall that a Boolean algebra is complete if every subset has a least up-
per bound. A typical example of a complete Boolean algebra is the algebra of
measurable subsets of [0, 1] modulo the ideal of measure zero sets. The algebra of
Borel subsets of [0, 1] modulo the ideal of first category sets is similarly a complete
Boolean algebra. Random and Cohen forcing, respectively, are isomorphic to dense
suborders of the positive elements of these complete Boolean algebras.
Suppose now that Q is the positive elements of some complete Boolean algebra
B. If φ is a formula in the forcing language, then define the truth value [[φ]] of φ
to be the least upper bound of all b ∈ B such that b  φ. Observe that if a ≤ [[φ]],
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then a cannot force ¬φ. Hence [[φ]] forces φ. The rules which govern the logical
connectives now take a particularly nice form:
[[¬φ]] = [[φ]]c [[φ ∧ ψ]] = [[φ]] ∧ [[ψ]] [[φ ∨ ψ]] = [[φ]] ∨ [[ψ]]
[[∀vφ]] =
∧
x˙
[[φ[x˙/v]]] [[∃vφ]] =
∨
x˙
[[φ[x˙/v]]]
Notice that while x˙ ranges over all Q-names in the last equations — a proper class
— the collection of all possible values of [[φ[x˙/v]]] is a set and therefore the last
items are meaningful.
In spite of the usefulness of complete Boolean algebras in understanding forcing
and also in some of the development of the abstract theory of forcing, forcings
of interest rarely present themselves as complete Boolean algebras (the notable
exceptions being Cohen and random forcing). While Theorem 5.5 allows us to
represent any forcing inside a complete Boolean algebra, defining forcing strictly in
terms of complete Boolean algebras would prove cumbersome in practice.
6. Names, interpretation, and semantics
In this section we will turn to the task of giving a formal definition of what
is meant by a Q-name and q  φ. This will in turn be used to give a semantic
perspective of forcing. The definitions in this section are not essential for under-
standing most forcing arguments and the reader may wish to skip this section on
their first reading of the material. Others, however, may wish to have a tangible
model of the axioms.
Before proceeding, we need to recall the notion of the rank of a set. If x is a
set, then the rank of x is defined recursively: the rank of the emptyset is 0 and the
rank of x is the least ordinal which is strictly greater than the ranks of its elements.
This is always a well defined quantity and it will sometimes be necessary to give
definitions by recursion on rank. We recall that formally an ordered pair (x, y) is
defined to be {x, {x, y}}; this is only relevant in that the rank of (x, y) is greater
than the ranks of either x or y.
Now let Q be a forcing, fixed for the duration of the section. If q ∈ Q, let Qq
denote the forcing ({r ∈ Q : r ≤ q},≤).
Definition 6.1 (name). A set x˙ is a Q-name if every element of x˙ is of the form
(y˙, q) where y˙ is a Qq-name and q is in Q.
(The requirement that y˙ be aQq-name is to help ensure that Property 5 is satisfied.)
Notice that this apparently implicit definition is actually a definition by recursion
on rank, as discussed in Section 2. Furthermore, if P ⊆ Q is a suborder, then any
P-name is also a Q-name.
The following provide two important examples of Q-names.
Definition 6.2 (check names). If x is a set, xˇ is defined recursively by
{(yˇ,1) : y ∈ x}.
Definition 6.3 (name for the generic filter). G˙ := {(qˇ, q) : q ∈ Q}.
As mentioned in the previous section, the notion of a Q-name is intended to
describe a procedure for building a new set from a given filter G ⊆ Q. This
procedure is formally described as follows.
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Definition 6.4 (interpretation). If G is any filter and x˙ is any Q-name, define
x˙(G) recursively by
x˙(G) := {y˙(G) : ∃p ∈ G ((y˙, p) ∈ x˙)}
Again, this is a definition by recursion on rank. In the analogy with randomness,
x˙(G) corresponds to evaluating a random variable at a given outcome.
The following gives the motivation for the definitions of xˇ and G˙.
Proposition 6.5. If H is any filter and x is any set, then xˇ(H) = x.
Proposition 6.6. If H is any filter, then G˙(H) = H.
Remark 6.7. It is possible to define Q-name to just be a synonym for set. The
definition of x˙(G) would be left unchanged so that only those elements of x˙ which
are ordered pairs with a second coordinate in Q play any role in the interpretation.
This alternative has the advantage of brevity and much of what is stated in the
previous section remains true with this alteration. On the other hand, it is easily
seen that Property 5 fails. For instance those sets which do not contain any ordered
pairs forms a proper class and each member of this class is forced by the trivial
condition to be equal to the emptyset.
We now turn to the formal definition of the forcing relation. The main complexity
of the definition of the forcing relation is tied up in the formal definition of p  x˙ ∈ y˙.
Definition 6.8 (forcing relation: atomic formulae). If Q is a forcing and x˙ and y˙
are Q-names, then we define the meaning of p  x˙ = y˙ and p  x˙ ∈ y˙ as follows
(the definition is by simultaneous recursion on rank):
a. p  x˙ = y˙ if and only if for all z˙ and p′ ≤ p,
(p′  z˙ ∈ x˙)↔ (p′  z˙ ∈ y˙).
b. p  x˙ ∈ y˙ if and only if for every p′ ≤ p there is a p′′ ≤ p′ and a (z˙, q) in y˙
such that p′′ ≤ q and p′′  x˙ = z˙.
Notice that the definition of p  x˙ = y˙ is precisely to ensure that the Axiom
of Extensionality — which asserts that two sets are equal if they have the same
set of elements — is forced by any condition. The definition of the forcing rela-
tion for nonatomic formulas is straightforward and is essentially determined by the
properties of the forcing relation mentioned already in Section 5.
Definition 6.9 (forcing relation: logical connectives). Suppose that p ∈ Q and φ
and ψ are formulas in the forcing language. The following are true:
a. p  ¬φ if there does not exist a q ≤ p such that q  φ.
b. p  φ ∧ ψ if and only if p  φ and p  ψ.
c. p  φ ∨ ψ if there does not exist a q ≤ p such that q  ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ.
d. p  ∀vφ if and only if for all x˙, p  φ[x˙/v].
e. p  ∃vφ if and only if there is an x˙ such that p  φ[x˙/v].
The interested reader may wish to stop and verify that the definitions of Q and
Q-name given in this section satisfy the properties stated in Section 5.
The following theorem is one of the fundamental results about forcing. It con-
nects the syntactic properties of the forcing relation with truth in generic extensions
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of models of set theory. If M is a countable transitive model of ZFC, Q is a forcing
in M , and G ⊆ Q is an M -generic filter, define
M [G] := {x˙(G) : x˙ ∈M and x˙ is a Q-name}.
In this context, M [G] is the generic extension of M by G and M is referred to as
the ground model. Notice that
M = {xˇ(G) : x ∈M} ⊆M [G] and G = G˙(G) ∈M [G].
The following theorem relates the semantics of forcing (i.e. truth in the generic
extension) with the syntax (i.e. the forcing relation).
Theorem 6.10. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of ZFC and that Q
is a forcing which is in M . If q is in Q, φ(v1, . . . , vn) is a formula in the language
of set theory, and x˙1, . . . , x˙n are in M , then the following are equivalent:
a. q  φ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n).
b. M [G] |= φ(x˙1(G), . . . , x˙n(G)) whenever G ⊆ Q is an M -generic filter and q
is in G.
Remark 6.11. This theorem can be modified to cover countable transitive models
of sufficiently large finite fragments of ZFC. In fact this is crucial if one wishes
to give a rigorous treatment of the semantics. By Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem, ZFC alone does not prove that there are any set models of ZFC (countable
or otherwise). This is in fact our main reason for de-emphasizing the semantics:
while it is formally necessary to work with models of finite fragments of ZFC, this
only introduces technicalities which are inessential to understanding what can be
achieved with forcing.
While we will generally not work with the semantics of forcing, let us note here
that it is conventional to use x˙ to denote a Q-name for an element x of a generic
extension M [G]. While such names are not unique, the choice generally does not
matter and this informal convention affords a great deal of notational economy.
We will now finish this section with some further discussion and notational con-
ventions concerning names. It is frequently the case in a forcing construction that
one encounters a Q-name for a function f˙ whose domain is forced by some condition
to be a ground model set; that is, for some set D, p  dom(f˙) = Dˇ. A particularly
common occurrence is when D = ω or, more generally, some ordinal. Under these
circumstances, it is common to abuse notation and regard f˙ as a function defined
on D, whose values are themselves names: f˙(x) is a Q-name y˙ such that it is forced
that f˙(xˇ) = y˙. Notice that if, for some sets A and B, p  f˙ : Aˇ → Bˇ, it need not
be the case that f˙(a) is of the form bˇ for some b in B — i.e. p need not decide the
value of f˙(a) for a given a ∈ A.
In most cases, names are not constructed explicitly. Rather a procedure is de-
scribed for how to build the object to which the name is referring. Properties 7 and
8 are then implicitly invoked. For example, if x˙ is a Q-name,
⋃
x˙ is the Q-name
for the unique set which is forced to be equal to the union of x˙. Notice that there
is an abuse of notation at work here: formally, x˙ is a set which has a union y. It
need not be the case that y is even a Q-name and certainly one should not expect
1 
⋃
x˙ = yˇ. This is one of the reasons for using “dot notation”: it emphasizes the
role of the object as a name.
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A more typical example of is ω1, the least uncountable ordinal. Since ZFC proves
“there is a unique set ω1 such that ω1 is an ordinal, ω1 is uncountable, and every
element of ω1 is countable,” it follows that if Q is any forcing, 1 Q ∃xφ(x), where
φ(x) asserts x is the least uncountable ordinal. In particular there is a Q-name x˙
such that 1 Q φ(x˙). Unless readability dictates otherwise, such names are denoted
by adding a “dot” above the usual notation (e.g. ω˙1).
Another example is R. Recall that R is the completion of Q with respect to its
metric — formally the collection of all equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of
rationals. We use this same formal definition of R to define R˙: if Q is a forcing,
R˙ is the collection of all Q-names for equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of
rational numbers. Notice that R˙ is not the same as Rˇ and, more to the point, we
need not even have that 1 Q R˙ = Rˇ for a given forcing Q. This construction also
readily generalizes to define X˙ if X is a complete metric space. The Q-name X˙ is
then the collection of all Q-names x˙ such that 1 forces that x˙ is an equivalence class
of Cauchy sequences of elements of Xˇ. That is, X˙ is a Q-name for the completion
of Xˇ.
Finally, there are some definable sets which are always interpreted as ground
model sets and do not depend on the generic filter. Two typical examples are finite
and countable ordinals such as 0, 1, ω, and ω2 as well as sets such as Q. In such
cases, checks are suppressed in writing the names for ease of readability — we will
write Q and not Qˇ or Q˙ in formulae which occur in the forcing language.
7. The cast
We will now introduce the examples which we will put to work throughout the
rest of the article. The first class of examples provides the justification for viewing
forcings as abstract notions of randomness.
Example 7.1 (random forcing). Define R to be the collection of all measurable
subsets of [0, 1] which have positive measure. If I is any index set, let RI denote
the collection of all measurable subsets of [0, 1]I which have positive measure. Here
[0, 1] is equipped with Lebesgue measure and [0, 1]I is given the product measure.
Define q ≤ p to mean q ⊆ p. This order is not separative so formally here we
define R and RI to be the corresponding separative quotients. This amounts to
identifying those measurable sets which differ by a measure zero set. Notice that
every element of RI contains a compact set in RI — the compact elements of RI
are dense. Furthermore, any two elements of RI are compatible if their intersection
has positive measure.
When working with a forcing Q, one is rarely interested in the generic filter itself
but rather in some generic object which can be derived in some natural way from
the generic filter. For instance, in RI it is forced that⋂
{cl(q) : q ∈ G˙}
contains a unique element. We will let r˙ denote a fixed RI -name for this element.
For each i ∈ I, let r˙i denote a fixed RI -name for the ith coordinate of r˙ and observe
that for all i 6= j in I,
Di,j := {q ∈ RI : (x ∈ cl(q))→ (x(i) 6= x(j))}
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is dense. Therefore 1 RI ∀i 6= j ∈ Iˇ (r˙i 6= r˙j). In particular, it is forced by RI
that |R˙| ≥ |Iˇ|. (Notice however, that we have not established that if, e.g., I = ℵ2,
then 1 RI ℵ˙2 = ℵˇ2. This will be established in Section 8.)
In the context of R, we will use r˙ to denote a R-name for the unique element
of
⋂
{cl(q) : q ∈ G˙}. If M is a transitive model of ZFC, then r ∈ [0, 1] is in every
measure 1 Borel set coded in M if and only if {q ∈ R ∩M : r ∈ q} is a M -generic
filter. Such an r is commonly referred to as a random real over M . The notion of
a random real was first introduced by Solovay [25].
The next class of examples includes Cohen’s original forcing from [5]. Just as
random forcing is rooted in measure theory, Cohen forcing is rooted in the notion
of Baire category.
Example 7.2 (Cohen forcing). Let C denote the collection of all finite partial
functions from ω to 2: all functions q such that the domain of q is a finite subset of
ω and the range of q is contained in 2 = {0, 1}. We order C by q ≤ p if q extends p
as a function. If I is a set, let CI denote the collection of all finite partial functions
from I × ω to 2, similarly ordered by extension. It is not difficult to show that CI
is isomorphic to a dense suborder of the collection of all nonempty open subsets
of [0, 1]I , ordered by containment. This makes CI analogous to RI (in fact it is a
suborder), although viewing CI as a collection of finite partial functions will often
be more convenient from the point of view of notation.
It is very often the case that forcings consist of a collection of partial functions
ordered by extension. By this we mean that q ≤ p means that p is the restriction of
q to the domain of p. A filter in the forcing is then a collection of functions which
is directed under containment and whose union is therefore also a function. This
union is the generic object derived from the generic filter.
In the case of CI , observe that for each i 6= j in I and n < ω, both
{q ∈ CI : (i, n) ∈ dom(q)}
and
{q ∈ CI : ∃m
(
({(i,m), (j,m)} ⊆ dom(q)) ∧ (q(i,m) 6= q(j,m))
)
}
are dense. In particular, the generic object will be a function from I ×ω into 2. As
in the case of RI , such a generic object naturally corresponds to an indexed family
(ri : i ∈ I) of elements of [0, 1] and genericity ensures that these elements are all
distinct.
If M is a transitive model of ZFC, then r ∈ [0, 1] is in every dense open set
coded in M if and only if the set of finite restrictions of the binary expansion of
r is an M -generic filter for the forcing C. Such an r is commonly referred to as a
Cohen real over M . Notice that [0, 1] is a union of a measure 0 set and a set of
first category: for every n, the rationals in [0, 1] are contained in a relatively dense
open set of measure less than 1/n. Thus no element of [0, 1] is both a Cohen real
and a random real over a transitive model of ZFC. In fact there are qualitative
difference between Cohen and random reals as well. For instance, in the case of
random forcing it is forced that
lim
n→∞
1
n
|{i < n : r(i) = 1}| =
1
2
where as in the case of Cohen forcing, it is forced that the limit does not exist.
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The next example of a forcing appears similar at first to random forcing, but in
fact it is quite different in nature.
Example 7.3 (Amoeba forcing). If 1 > ǫ > 0, then define Aǫ to be the collection
of all elements of R of measure greater than ǫ. This is regarded as a forcing with
the order induced from R.
Notice that the compatibility relation on Aǫ differs from that inherited from
R: two conditions in Aǫ are compatible in Aǫ if and only if their intersection has
measure greater than ǫ.
The previous forcings all introduce a new subset of ω to the ground model. The
next example adds a new ultrafilter on ω but, as we will see in Section 14, it does
not introduce a new subset of ω.
Example 7.4. Let [ω]ω denote the collection of all infinite subsets of ω. The
ordering of containment on [ω]ω is not separative; its separative quotient is obtained
by identifying those x and y which have finite symmetric difference. We will abuse
notation and denote this quotient by [ω]ω as well.
The next forcing was introduced by Mathias [19] to study infinite dimensional
generalizations of Ramsey’s theorem.
Example 7.5 (Mathias forcing). Let M denote the collection of all pairs p =
(ap, Ap) such that Ap is in [ω]
ω and ap is a finite initial part of Ap. Define q ≤ p to
mean ap ⊆ aq and Aq ⊆ Ap. Note in particular that in this situation ap is an initial
segment of aq and aq \ ap is contained in Ap. This forcing is known as Mathias
forcing.
The final example is an illustration of the potential raw power of forcing. Typ-
ically the phenomenon of collapsing cardinals to ℵ0 is something one wishes to
avoid.
Example 7.6 (collapsing to ℵ0). If X is a set, consider the collection X<ω of all
finite sequences of elements of X , ordered by extension. Observe that if x is in X ,
then the collection of all elements of X<ω which contain x in their range is dense.
Thus X<ω forces that |Xˇ | = ℵ0. Notice that if X = R in this example, then it is
forced that |Rˇ| = ℵˇ0 < |R˙|.
8. The countable chain condition
Something which is often an important consideration in the analysis of a forcing is
whether uncountability is preserved. That is, does 1 Q ℵˇ1 = ℵ˙1? More generally,
one can ask whether cardinals are preserved by forcing with Q: if X and Y are sets
such that |X | < |Y |, then does 1 Q |Xˇ| < |Yˇ |?
In general, this can be a very subtle matter (and even can be influenced by
forcing). One way to demonstrate that a forcing preserves cardinals is to verify
that it satisfies the countable chain condition (c.c.c.). A forcing Q satisfies the
c.c.c. if every family of pairwise incompatible elements of Q is at most countable.
The following proposition dates to Cohen’s proof that the Continuum Hypothesis
is independent of ZFC.
Proposition 8.1. Suppose that Q is a c.c.c. forcing. If κ is a regular cardinal, then
1  κˇ is a regular cardinal. In particular, κ is a cardinal then 1  κ is a cardinal
and hence for every ordinal α, 1  ℵ˙α = ℵˇα.
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Proof. The second conclusion follows from the first since every cardinal is the supre-
mum of a set of successor cardinals and every supremum of a set of successor car-
dinals is a cardinal. Let κ be a regular cardinal and Q be a given forcing. Suppose
that f˙ and λ˙ are Q-names and that p is an element of Q such that
p  (λ˙ ∈ κˇ) ∧ (f˙ : λ˙→ κˇ)
By extending p if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that λ˙ = λˇ
for some λ < κ. It is sufficient to show that p forces that f˙ is not a surjection. If
κ is countable, then λ is finite and it is possible to decide f˙ by deciding its values
one at a time (this does not require that Q is c.c.c.). Thus we will assume that κ
is uncountable.
For each α < λ, define
F (α) := {β < κ : ∃q ≤ p(q  f˙(α) = βˇ)}.
Notice that if β 6= β′ are in F (α) and q forces that f˙(α) = βˇ and q′ forces that
f˙(α) = βˇ′, then q and q′ are incompatible (otherwise any extension q¯ would force
βˇ = f˙(α) = βˇ′). Since Q is c.c.c., F (α) is countable and has an upper bound
g(α) < κ.
Since κ is regular, the range of g is bounded. We are therefore finished once we
show that
p  ∀α ∈ λˇ (f˙(α) ∈ Fˇ (α)).
By Proposition 5.2, this is equivalent to showing that for all α in λ, p  f˙(α) ∈ Fˇ (α).
Suppose for contradiction that this is not the case. Then there is a q ≤ p and an
α in λ such that q  f˙(α) 6∈ Fˇ (α). By Proposition 4, there is a q′ ≤ q and a β < κ
such that q′  f˙(α) = βˇ. But now β ∈ F (α), a contradiction. 
Proposition 8.2. Suppose that Q is a c.c.c. forcing and that (qξ : ξ < ω1) is a
sequence of conditions in Q. Then there is a p such that
p  {ξ ∈ ωˇ1 : qξ ∈ G˙} is uncountable.
Remark 8.3. Notice that this characterizes the c.c.c.: if A is an uncountable an-
tichain in a forcing Q, then any condition forces that Aˇ ∩ G˙ contains at most one
element.
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case. Then
1  ∃β ∈ ωˇ1∀ξ ∈ ωˇ1 (qξ ∈ G˙→ ξ < β).
By Property 7 of the forcing relation, there is a Q-name β˙ for an element of ω1
such that
1  ∀ξ ∈ ωˇ1 (qξ ∈ G˙→ ξ < β˙).
As in the proof of Proposition 8.1, the set of α < ω1 such that, for some q ∈ Q,
q  β˙ = αˇ is countable and therefore bounded by some γ. That is
1  ∀ξ ∈ ωˇ1 (qξ ∈ G˙→ ξ < γˇ).
But now qγ forces that qˇγ is in G˙, a contradiction. 
We will now return to some of the examples introduced in Section 7.
Proposition 8.4. For any index set I, both RI and CI are c.c.c. forcings.
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Proof. In the case of RI , this is just a reformulation of the assertion that if F is an
uncountable family of measurable subsets of [0, 1]I , each having positive measure,
then there are two elements of F which intersect in a set of positive measure. The
reason for this is that if F is uncountable, then for some ǫ > 0 there are more
than 1/ǫ elements of F with measure at least ǫ. At least two of these elements
must intersect in a set of positive measure. The same argument applies to CI , by
observing that we may view CI as a dense suborder of the collection of all nonempty
open subsets of [0, 1]I , ordered by containment. Since any nonempty open subset
of [0, 1]I has positive measure we may view CI as a suborder of RI . Moreover,
conditions p, q ∈ CI which are compatible in R are compatible in CI . 
Proposition 8.5. The forcing Aǫ satisfies the c.c.c. for every ǫ > 0.
Proof. Let D denote the collection of all elements of Aǫ which are finite unions of
rational intervals. Notice that D is countable. For each p in D, let Fp denote the
collection of all elements q of Aǫ such that q ⊆ p and
λ(p)− λ(q) <
λ(p) − ǫ
2
.
Notice that
⋃
p∈D Fp contains all of the compact sets in Aǫ which are in turn dense
in Aǫ. Moreover, any two elements of Fp intersect in a set of measure greater than
ǫ and hence have a common lower bound in Aǫ. If X ⊆ Aǫ is uncountable, two
distinct elements of X must have extensions in the same Fp for some p and thus
be compatible. Hence any antichain in Aǫ is countable and Aǫ is c.c.c.. 
Remark 8.6. The reader may wonder why we have not bothered to generalize Aǫ to
a larger index set, given that we did this for R. The reason is that, for uncountable
index sets, the analog of Aǫ is not c.c.c. and in fact collapses the cardinality of I
to become countable.
We finish this section by demonstrating that the Continuum Hypothesis isn’t
provable within ZFC. By Theorem 8.1, Rω2 forces that ℵ˙1 = ℵˇ1 and ℵ˙2 = ℵˇ2. On
the other hand, we have already observed that for all α < β < ω2,
1 Rω2 r˙α 6= r˙β .
Hence Rω2 forces that |R˙| ≥ ℵˇ2 = ℵ˙2. Since the set of formulas which are forced
by 1 is a consistent theory extending ZFC and containing |R| ≥ ℵ2, this establishes
that that ZFC cannot prove the Continuum Hypothesis. The same argument shows
that Cω2 forces that CH is false; this was the essence of Cohen’s proof [5].
9. An intersection property of families of sets of positive measure*
The purpose of this section is to use the tools which we have developed in order
to prove the following intersection property of sets of positive measure in [0, 1].
Proposition 9.1. If X ⊆ R is uncountable and (Bx : x ∈ X) is an indexed
collection of Borel subsets of [0, 1], each having positive measure, then there is a
nonempty set Y ⊆ X such that Y has no isolated points and such that
⋂
{By : y ∈
Y } has positive measure.
Proof. By replacing each Bx with a subset if necessary, we may assume that each
Bx is compact. Similarly, by replacing X with a subset if necessary, we may assume
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that there is an ǫ > 0 such that if x is in X , then Bx has measure greater than ǫ.
Let T consist of all finite length sequences σ = (σi : i < n) such that:
(10) σ is an increasing sequence of finite subsets of X ;
(11)
⋂
{Bx : x ∈ σi} has measure greater than ǫ for all i < n;
(12) for each i < n, if x is in σi, then there is a y distinct from x in σi such that
|x− y| < 1/i.
Observe that if σ is an infinite sequence all of whose initial parts are in T , then
Y :=
⋃
{σi : i < ∞} has no isolated points and
⋂
{By : y ∈ Y } has measure at
least ǫ. Conversely, if there is a countable Y ⊆ X with no isolated points and⋂
x∈F Bx has measure greater than ǫ whenever F ⊆ Y is finite, then T has an
infinite path. Thus by Proposition 5.4, it is sufficient to show that the conclusion
of the proposition is forced by some condition in some forcing.
Consider the Amoeba forcing Aǫ and let Z˙ be the Q-name for the set {x ∈ Xˇ :
Bˇx ∈ G˙}. Observe that every condition forces that the intersection of every finite
subset of {Bˇx : x ∈ Z˙} ⊆ G˙ is in G˙ and hence in Aˇǫ. By Proposition 8.2, there is
a q in Aǫ such that q forces that Z˙ is uncountable. By Property 8 of the forcing
relation, q forces that Z˙ contains a countable subset Y˙ with no isolated points.
This finishes the proof. 
10. The Halpern-La¨uchli theorem*
The Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem is a Ramsey-theoretic result concerning colorings
of products of finitely branching trees. Before stating the theorem, we need to first
define some terminology. Recall that a subset T of ω<ω is a tree if it is closed under
initial segments: whenever t is in T and s is an initial part of t, it follows that s is
in T . A tree T ⊆ ω<ω comes equipped with a natural partial order: s ≤ t if and
only if s is an initial part of t. If T ⊆ ω<ω is a tree and l < ω, the lth level of T
consists of all elements of T of length l and is denoted (T )l.
All trees considered in this section will be assumed to be pruned without further
mention: every element will have at least one immediate successor. A tree T ⊆
ω<ω is finitely branching if every element of T has only finitely many immediate
successors in T . If S ⊆ T ⊆ ω<ω are trees and J ⊆ ω is infinite, then we say that
S is a strong subtree of T based on J if whenever s is in S with length in J , every
immediate successor of s in T is in S. The Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem can now be
stated as follows.
Theorem 10.1. [10] If (Ti : i < d) is a sequence of finitely branching subtrees of
ω<ω and
f :
∞⋃
l=0
∏
i<d
(Ti)l → k
then there exists an infinite set L ⊆ ω and strong subtrees Si ⊆ Ti based on L for
each i < d such that f is constant when restricted to
⋃
l∈L
∏
i<d(Si)l.
Unlike essentially all other Ramsey-theoretic statements concerning the count-
ably infinite, the full form of the Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem — at least at present
— cannot be derived from the machinery of semigroup dynamics of spaces of ultra-
filters (see [11], [28]). The special case of the Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem for n-ary
trees is a consequence of a form of the Hales-Jewett Theorem, which can be proved
using semigroup dynamics — see [28]. The proof which is presented in this section
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is based on forcing and is an inessential modification of an argument due to Leo
Harrington (see [31]).
In order to prove the Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem, we will derive it from the so-
called dense set form of the theorem. If T ⊆ ω<ω is a tree and t is in S, then a set
D ⊆ T is (m,n)-dense in T above t if D ⊆ (T )n and whenever u is in (T )m with
t ⊆ u, there is a v in D such that u ⊆ v. If t is the null string, then we just say
that D is (m,n)-dense in T .
Theorem 10.2. If (Ti : i < d) is a sequence of finitely branching subtrees of ω
<ω
and
f :
∞⋃
l=0
∏
i<d
(Ti)l → k
then there is an l and a t¯ in
∏
i<d(Ti)l such that for every m ≥ l there is an n ≥ m
and sets (Di : i < d) such that for each i < d, Di is (m,n)-dense above ti in Ti and
such that f is constant on
∏
i<dDi.
The original form of the Halpern-La¨uchli Theorem is an immediate consequence
of the dense set version and the following observation.
Observation 10.3. Let T ⊆ ω<ω be a tree and t be an element of T . If (Dp : p <
∞) is a sequence of subsets of T such that for some increasing sequence (mp : p <
∞), Dp is (mp,mp+1)-dense in T above t, then the downward closure of
⋃∞
p=0Dp
contains a strong subtree of T which is based on {mp : p <∞}.
It is also not difficult to see that, unlike the standard formulation of the Halpern-
La¨uchli Theorem, the special case of Theorem 10.2 in which each Ti is 2
<ω is
equivalent to the theorem in its full generality.
Harrington’s proof of the Halpern-La¨uchli theorem uses the forcing relation to
reduce the desired Ramsey-theoretic properties of trees to Ramsey-theoretic prop-
erties of cardinals. In the proof we will need some standard definitions and facts
from combinatorial set theory (see, e.g., [16, Ch.II]). If κ is a regular cardinal, a
subset S of κ is stationary if it intersects every closed and unbounded subset of
κ. Clearly every stationary subset of κ has cardinality κ. Furthermore, if µ is
an infinite cardinal less than κ, then the set of all ordinals in κ of cofinality µ is
stationary. We will need the following property of stationary sets.
Lemma 10.4 (Pressing Down Lemma; see [16]). Suppose that θ is a regular cardinal
and S ⊆ θ is a stationary set. If r : S → θ satisfies that r(ξ) < ξ for all ξ ∈ S,
then r is constant on a stationary subset of S. In particular if a stationary subset
of θ is partitioned into fewer than θ sets, then one of the pieces of the partition is
stationary.
We will need the following variant of the ∆-System Lemma.
Lemma 10.5. Suppose that X is a set, θ is the successor of a regular cardinal, and
{pξ : ξ < θ} is a family of partial functions from X to 2 such that for every ξ < θ,
2|dom(pξ)| < θ. Then there exists a cofinal H ⊆ θ such that
⋃
ξ∈H pξ is a function.
Proof. Set θ := κ+. Observe that by replacing X with the union of the domains of
the pξ’s if necessary, we may assume that |X | ≤ θ and thus moreover that X ⊆ θ.
For each ξ < θ, define aξ := dom(pξ)∩ξ. Observe that | dom(pξ)| must be less than
κ for each ξ and thus aξ is a bounded subset of ξ whenever cf(ξ) = κ. Let E ⊆ θ
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consist of all δ such that if ξ < δ, then sup(dom(pξ)) < δ. It is easily checked that
E is a closed and unbounded set. By Lemma 10.4, there is a stationary S ⊆ E
consisting of ordinals of cofinality κ and a ζ such that if ξ is in S, sup aξ < ζ.
By the pigeonhole principle, there is a stationary set H ⊆ S and partial function
r from θ to 2 such that if ξ is in H , then pξ ↾ ξ = r. Now if ξ < η are in H ,
then pξ
⋃
pη is a function. To see this, suppose that α is in dom(pξ) ∩ dom(pη).
Since η is in E, it must be that α < η. Thus α is in aξ = aη = dom(r) and hence
pξ(α) = r(α) = pη(α). 
Next, we will need two closely related Ramsey-theoretic statements which are
relatives of the Erdo˝s-Rado Theorem but which have simpler proofs.
Lemma 10.6. Suppose that (θi : i < d) is a sequence of uncountable regular
cardinals satisfying 2θi < θi+1 if i < d − 1. If f :
∏
i<d θi → ω, then there exist
cofinal sets Hi ⊆ θi for each i < d such that f is constant on
∏
i<dHi.
Proof. The proof is by induction on d. If d is given and ξ < θd−1, fix H
ξ
i ⊆ θi for
each i < d− 1 such that f takes the constant value g(ξ) on( ∏
i<d−1
Hi
)
× {ξ}
(if d = 1, then the product over the emptyset is the trivial map with domain ∅
and this is vacuously true). By applying the pigeonhole principle and our cardinal
arithmetic assumption, there is an Hd−1 ⊆ θd−1 such that g is constant on Hd−1
and Hξi does not depend on ξ for ξ ∈ Hd−1. It follows that f is constant when
restricted to
∏
i<dHi, where Hi := H
ξ
i for some (equivalently any) ξ in Hd−1. 
Lemma 10.7. Suppose that X is a set and (θi : i < d) is a sequence of successors
of infinite regular cardinals such that 2θi < θi+1 if i < d− 1. If {pσ : σ ∈
∏
i<d θi}
is a family of finite partial functions from X into a countable set, then there are
Hi ⊆ θi of cardinality θi such that⋃
{pσ : σ ∈
∏
i<d
Hi}
is a function.
Proof. The proof is by induction on d. The case d = 1 follows from Lemma 10.5.
Now suppose (θi : i ≤ d) and (pσ : σ ∈
∏
i≤d θi) are given. For each ξ in θd, find
(Hξi : i < d) such that H
ξ
i ⊆ θi and such that⋃
{pσaξ : σ ∈
∏
i<d
Hi}
is a function, which we will denote by qξ. Applying the pigeonhole principle, find
a cofinal Γ ⊆ θd such that, for some (Hi : i < d), H
ξ
i = Hi if ξ is in Γ. Now apply
Lemma 10.5 to (qξ : ξ ∈ Γ) to find Hd ⊆ Γ of cardinality θd such that⋃
ξ∈Hd
qξ =
⋃
{pσ : σ ∈
∏
i≤d
Hi}
is a function. 
Finally we turn to the task of proving the dense set form of the Halpern-La¨uchli
Theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 10.2. Suppose that
f :
∞⋃
k=0
∏
i<d
2k → 2
is given and define (θi : i < d) by θ0 = ℵ1 and θi+1 = (2θi)++. Set Q to be the
collection of all finite partial functions from θd−1 into 2
<ω. (This is an inessential
modification of the forcing Cθd−1 .) The order on Q is defined by q ≤ p if the domain
of q contains the domain of p and p(α) is an initial part q(α) whenever α is in the
domain of p. Observe that r˙ξ :=
⋃
q∈G˙ q(ξˇ) describes an element of 2
ω.
Applying Property 8 of the forcing relation, fix a Q-name U˙ for a nonprincipal
ultrafilter on ω. Since U˙ is forced to be an ultrafilter, for each σ ∈
∏
i<d θi there is
a e˙σ such that it is forced that there such that
U˙σ = {m ∈ ω : f(r˙σ(0) ↾ m, . . . , r˙σ(d−1) ↾ m) = e˙σ}
is in U˙ . By Property 4 of the forcing relation, there is a pσ which decides e˙σ to be
some eσ ∈ {0, 1}. By extending pσ if necessary, we may assume that there is an lσ
such that if α is in the domain of pσ, pσ(α) has length lσ. Define
g(σ) :=
(
eσ, lσ, pσ(σ(0)), . . . , pσ(σ(d− 1))
)
.
By Lemmas 10.6 and 10.7, there are cofinal sets Hi ⊆ θi such that:
(13) g is constantly (e, l, t0, . . . , td−1) on
∏
i<dHi for some (e, l) and t0, . . . , td−1
in 2l;
(14) every finite subset of {pσ : σ ∈
∏
i<dHi} has a common lower bound in Q.
Now let m ≥ l be given. For each i < d, let Ai be a subset of Hi of cardinality 2m−l
and fix a bijection between Ai and the set of binary sequences of length m− l. Let
q be a condition in Q which is a common lower bound for
{pσ : σ ∈
∏
i<d
Ai}
and such that if α is the element of Ai which corresponds to u ∈ 2m−l under the
bijection, then q(α) has ti
au as an initial part. That is, q forces that r˙α ↾ m = ti
au.
Let q¯ be an extension of q such that for some n > m, q¯ forces that
nˇ ∈
⋂
{U˙σ : σ ∈
∏
i<d
Ai}.
By extending q¯ if necessary, we may assume that for each i < d and α in Ai, q¯(α)
has length at least n. Finally, set Di to be the set of all w ∈ 2n such that for some
α in Ai, q¯(α) ↾ n = w.
We will now show that Di is (m,n) dense above ti for each i < d and that
f ↾
∏
i<dDi is constantly e. To see the former, fix i < d and let u be in 2
m−l and
let α be the corresponding element of Ai. By our choice of q, q(α) ↾ m = ti
au and
by our choice of q¯ and the definition of Di, there is a w in Di such that q¯(α) ↾ n = w.
To see the latter, suppose (wi : i < d) ∈
∏
i<dDi and let σ ∈
∏
i<dAi be such that
q¯(αi) ↾ n = wi. Clearly q¯ forces that
(r˙σ(i) ↾ n : i < d) = (wi : i < d).
Furthermore, by the definition of Uσ and n, we have that
f((r˙σ(i) ↾ n : i < d)) = f((wi : i < d)) = e.
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
11. Universally Baire sets and absoluteness
In this section, we will introduce an abstract notion of regularity for subsets of
complete metric spaces which is useful in proving absoluteness results. Let (X, d)
be a (not necessarily separable) complete metric space. Recall that the completion
of a metric space is taken to be the collection of all equivalence classes of its Cauchy
sequences. Recall also that if Q is a forcing, then X˙ represents a Q-name for the
completion of Xˇ .
In this section we will be interested in interpreting names by filters which are
not fully generic. Notice, for instance, that it is possible that y˙ is forced to be equal
to xˇ, even though there are some (non generic) ultrafilters which interpret y˙ to be
different than x. For this reason it is necessary to work with names which have
better properties with respect to arbitrary interpretations.
Definition 11.1. If Q is a forcing, then a nice Q-name for an element of X˙ is a
Q-name x˙ such that, for some countable collection of dense subsets D of Q, x˙(G)
is a Cauchy sequence in (X, d) whenever G is D-generic.
Remark 11.2. For technical reasons we need to make nice Q-names for elements
of a complete metric space X˙ to formally be a Cauchy sequence rather than an
equivalence class of a Cauchy sequence, even though the intent is only to refer to
the limit point corresponding to the equivalence class. Also, while the completion
of a complete metric space is not literally equal to the original space, there is a
canonical isometry between the two and usually there is no need to distinguish
them. The point in the above definition is that the only meaningful way to define
X˙ is as the name for the completion of Xˇ . Hence names for elements of X˙ are
names for equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences. When they are interpreted by
a sufficiently generic filter, they will typically result in elements of the completion
of X , not in elements of X .
The next lemma shows nice Q-names can be used to represent any element of X˙
whenever Q is a forcing and X is a complete metric space.
Lemma 11.3. If (x˙n : n < ∞) is a Q-name for a Cauchy sequence in Xˇ, then
there exists a nice Q-name (y˙n : n <∞) for an element of X˙ such that it is forced
that (y˙n : n <∞) = (x˙n : n <∞).
Proof. Define
y˙n := {(yˇ, q) ∈ X ×Q : q  x˙n = yˇ}
and let Dn be the elements of Q which decide both x˙n and the least m˙ such that
for all i, j > m˙, d(x˙i, x˙j) < 1/n. It is readily verified that D := {Dn : n < ∞}
witnesses that (y˙n : n <∞) is a nice Q-name for an element of X˙ . 
Definition 11.4. (see [6]) Let (X, d) be a complete metric space. A subset A of
X is universally Baire if whenever Q is a forcing there is a Q-name A˙ such that for
every nice Q-name x˙ for an element of X˙, there is a countable collection of dense
subsets D of Q such that:
a. {q ∈ Q : q decides x˙ ∈ A˙} is in D;
b. whenever G is a D-generic filter in Q, x˙(G) is in (the completion of) X and
x˙(G) is in A if and only if there is a q in G such that q  x˙ ∈ A˙.
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The following proposition, while easy to establish, is important in what follows.
Proposition 11.5. If A˙ and B˙ are Q-names which both witness that A is univer-
sally Baire with respect to Q, then 1  A˙ = B˙.
Proof. If this were not the case, then there would exist a nice Q-name x˙ for an
element of X˙and a p in Q such that
p  x˙ ∈ (A˙△B˙).
Suppose without loss of generality that p  x˙ ∈ (A˙\B˙). If G is a sufficiently generic
filter containing p, then x˙(G) will be in A since p is in G and p forces that x˙ is in
A˙. On the other hand, x˙(G) can’t be in A since p is in G and p forces that x˙ is not
in B˙, a contradiction. 
The following is also easy to establish. The proof is left to the interested reader.
Proposition 11.6. The universally Baire subsets of a complete metric space form
a σ-algebra which includes the open subsets of X. In particular, every Borel set in
a complete metric space is universally Baire.
Putting this all together, we have the following proposition which will be used in
establishing absoluteness results. If φ(v1, . . . , vn) is a logical formula and x1, . . . , xn
are sets, then we say that φ(x1, . . . , xn) is generically absolute if whenever Q is a
forcing and q is in Q, q  φ(xˇ1, . . . , xˇn) if and only if φ(x1, . . . , xn) is true.
Proposition 11.7. The assertion that a given countable Boolean combination of
universally Baire subsets of a complete metric space is nonempty is generically
absolute.
12. A property of marker sequences for Bernoulli shifts*
In this section we will give an example of how homogeneity properties of a
forcing can be put to use. The goal of the section is to prove a special case of a
theorem of Gao, Jackson, and Seward concerning marker sequences in Bernoulli
shift actions. Let Γ be a countable discrete group acting continuously on a Polish
space X . A decreasing sequence of Borel subsets (An : n <∞) of X is a vanishing
marker sequence for the action if each An intersects every orbit of the action and⋂∞
n=0An = ∅. Certainly a necessary requirement for such a sequence to exist is
that every orbit of Γ is infinite. In fact this is also a sufficient condition; this is
the content of the so-called Marker Lemma (see, e.g., [14]). The following result of
Gao, Jackson, and Seward grew out of their analysis of the Borel chromatic number
of the free part of the shift graph on 2Z
2
.
Theorem 12.1. [9] Suppose that Γ is a countable group, k is a natural number,
and (An : n < ∞) is a vanishing marker sequence for the free part of the shift
action of Γ on kΓ. For every increasing sequence (Fn : n <∞) of finite sets which
covers Γ, there is an x ∈ kΓ such that:
a. the closure of the orbit of x is contained in the free part of the action;
b. the closure of the orbit of x is a minimal nonempty closed subset of kΓ which
is invariant under the action;
c. there are infinitely many n such that, for some g in Fn, g · x is in An.
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Our interest will be primarily in the last clause, although in this generality, [9]
represents the first proof of the first two clauses in the theorem.
We will focus our attention on the special case Γ = Z and k = 2 (the case Zd
and k arbitrary is just notationally more complicated, but the full generality of the
theorem requires a different argument). In this context, the above theorem can be
rephrased as follows.
Theorem 12.2. [9] Suppose that (An : n < ∞) is a vanishing marker sequence
for the free part of the action of Z on 2Z by shift. For every f : N→ N such that
limn f(n) =∞, there exists an x in 2Z such that:
a. the closure of the orbit of x is contained in the free part of the action;
b. the closure of the orbit of x is a minimal nonempty closed subset of 2Γ which
is invariant under the action;
c. there are infinitely many n such that, for some i ∈ [−f(n), f(n)], x + i is in
An.
It will be useful to have a more combinatorial way of formulating the first two
conclusions of the theorem. They are provided by the following lemmas.
Lemma 12.3. (see [9]) If x is in 2Z, then the closure of the orbit of x is contained
in the free part of the action exactly when the following condition holds: for all
a ∈ Z \ {0}, there exists a finite interval B ⊆ Z such that for all c ∈ Z there is a
b ∈ B with
x(a+ b + c) 6= x(b + c).
Lemma 12.4. (see [9]) If x is in 2Z, then the closure of the orbit of x is a minimal
closed invariant subset of 2Z if and only if the following condition holds: for every
finite interval A ⊆ Z, there is a finite interval B ⊆ Z such that for all c ∈ Z there
is a b ∈ B such that for all a ∈ A
x(a+ c) = x(a+ b).
Define Q to consist of all finite partial functions q : Z→ 2 such that the domain
of q is an interval of integers, denoted Iq . If n is in Z and q is in Q, then the
translate of q by n is denoted q + n and is defined by (q + n)(i) = q(i − n) (with
q + n having domain {i ∈ Z : i − n ∈ Iq}). If q is in Q, define q¯ to be the bitwise
complement of q: q¯(i) := 1 − q(i). A disjoint union of conditions which is again a
condition will be referred to as a concatenation.
The order on Q is defined by q ≤ p if q = p or else q is a concatenation of a set S
of conditions, each of which is a translate of p or p¯ and such that p and a translate
of p¯ are in S. If G is a filter in Q such that
⋃
G is a total function x from Z to
2, then it is straightforward to check that x satisfies the conclusion of Lemma 12.4
and thus that the closure of the orbit of x is a minimal invariant closed subset of
2Z.
Under a mild genericity assumption on G, the closure of the orbit of x will be
contained in the free part of the action. For each p 6= 1 in Q and i <∞, define Dp,i
to be the set of all q in Q such that either q is incompatible with p or else q ≤ p,
m+ i is in the domain of q, and q(m+ i) 6= q(m), where m := max(Ip).
Lemma 12.5. Each Dp,i is a dense subset of Q and if G ⊆ Q is a filter which
intersects Dp,i for each p ∈ Q \ {1} and i < ∞, then x :=
⋃
G satisfies that the
closure of the orbit of x is contained in the free part of the action.
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Thus we have shown that 1 forces that x˙ =
⋃
G satisfies that the closure of
the orbit of x˙ is minimal and contained in the free part of the Bernoulli shift. The
following proposition, when combined with Proposition 11.7, implies Theorem 12.2.
Proposition 12.6. Suppose that (An : n <∞) is a vanishing sequence of markers
for the free part of the Bernoulli shift Z y 2Z and that f : N → N is a function
such that limn f(n) =∞. Every condition in Q forces that for every m there is an
n ≥ m such that x˙+ k ∈ A˙n for some k with −f(n) ≤ k ≤ f(n).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that this is not the case. Then there is a p in Q
such that p forces: there is an m such that for every n ≥ m, if −f(n) ≤ k ≤ f(n)
then x˙ + k 6∈ A˙m. By replacing p with a stronger condition if necessary, we may
assume that there is an m such that p forces that for every n ≥ m, if −f(n) ≤ k ≤
f(n) then x˙ + k 6∈ A˙m. Let q := p ∪ (p¯ + l) where l is the length of Ip. Observe
that q ≤ p and that if r ≤ q and i ∈ Z, then there is a j with 0 ≤ j < 2l such that
r − i+ j is compatible with p; simply choose j such that i− j is a multiple of 2l.
Let n ≥ m be such that f(n) is greater than 2l and find a r ≤ q and an i ∈ Z
such that r forces that x˙ + i is in A˙n. This is possible since it is forced that A˙n
meets every orbit (strictly speaking, we are appealing to Proposition 11.7 here).
Now, let j < 2|p| be such that r is compatible with p+ i+ j.
We now have that r− i+ j forces that x˙+ j is in A˙n. This follows from the fact
that
1  x˙− i+ j is generic over the ground model.
(This follows from the observation that if E ⊆ Q is exhaustive, then so is any
translate of E.) Recall that r − i + j is compatible with p and let s be a common
lower bound for r − i+ j and p. It follows that s forces that both x˙+ j 6∈ A˙n and
x˙+ j ∈ A˙n, a contradiction. 
13. Todorcevic’s absoluteness theorem for Rosenthal compacta
We will now use the results of Section 11 to prove Todorcevic’s absoluteness
theorem for Rosenthal compacta. Fix a Polish space X . Recall that a real valued
function defined on X is Baire class 1 if it is the limit of a pointwise convergent
sequence of continuous functions. Baire characterized functions f which are not
Baire class 1 as those for which there exist rational numbers p < q and nonempty
sets D0, D1 ⊆ X such that the closures of D0 and D1 coincide, have no isolated
points, and
sup
x∈D0
f(x) ≤ p < q ≤ inf
x∈D1
f(x)
(see [2]). The collection of all Baire class 1 functions on a Polish space X is denoted
BC1(X) and is equipped with the topology of pointwise convergence.
A compact topological space which is homeomorphic to a subspace of BC1(X)
is said to be a Rosenthal compactum. This class includes all compact metric spaces
and is closed under taking closed subspaces and countable products. The following
are typical nonmetrizable examples.
Example 13.1 (Helly’s space; the double arrow). The collection of all nondecreas-
ing functions from [0, 1] to [0, 1] is known as Helly’s space. It is convex as a subset
of R[0,1]. The extreme points of this set are the characteristic functions of the inter-
vals (r, 1] and [r, 1]. This subspace is homeomorphic to the so-called double arrow
26 JUSTIN TATCH MOORE
space: the set [0, 1] × 2 equipped with the order topology from the lexicographic
order.
Example 13.2 (one point compactification). The constant 0 function, together
with the functions δr : [0, 1]→ R defined by
δr(t) :=
{
1 if t = r
0 otherwise.
This is homeomorphic to the one point compactification of a discrete set of cardi-
nality 2ℵ0 .
Rosenthal compacta enjoy a number of strong properties similar to those of
compact metric spaces. One which will play an important role below is countable
tightness : a topological space Z is countably tight if whenever a is in the closure of
A ⊆ Z, there is a countable A0 ⊆ A such that a is in the closure of A0.
Theorem 13.3. [21] Rosenthal compacta are countably tight.
In [27], Todorcevic derived a number of properties of Rosenthal compacta by
showing that there is a natural way to reinterpret such spaces as Rosenthal com-
pacta in generic extensions. This result is in fact a fairly routine consequence of
the machinery which was developed in Section 11 above.
First, we must verify that elements of BC1(X) extend to elements of BC1(X) in
the generic extension.
Lemma 13.4. [27] Suppose that (fn : n <∞) is a sequence of continuous functions
on a Polish space X. The assertion that (fn : n < ∞) converges pointwise is
generically absolute. Furthermore, if (fn : n <∞) and (gn : n <∞) are sequences
of continuous functions on X, the assertion that fn − gn → 0 pointwise on X is
generically absolute.
Proof. Let (fn : n <∞) be sequence of continuous functions. Observe that
⋃
ǫ>0
∞⋂
n=0
⋃
i,j≥n
{x ∈ X : |fi(x) − fj(x)| > ǫ}
specifies a countable Boolean combination of open subsets of X which is empty if
and only if (fn : n < ∞) converges pointwise. Thus the assertion that (fn : n <
∞) converges pointwise is generically absolute by Proposition 11.7. The second
conclusion is verified in a similar manner. 
Now suppose that Q is a forcing, X is a Polish space, and f is in BC1(X). By
Lemma 13.4, Q forces that there is a unique element of BC1(X˙) which extends fˇ ;
fix a Q-name f˙ for this extension. If K ⊆ BC1(X) is a Rosenthal compactum,
then K˙ is a Q-name for the closure of the set of extensions of elements of Kˇ to X˙.
(Specifically, it is a Q-name for the closure of {(f˙ ,1) : f ∈ K} in R˙X˙ .) Todorcevic’s
absoluteness theorem can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 13.5. [27] Suppose that X is a Polish space and F is a family of Baire
class 1 functions. The assertion that every accumulation point of F is Baire class
1 is generically absolute.
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Proof. Let X and F be fixed and let Q be a forcing. It is sufficient to show that
the assertion that F has a pointwise accumulation point which is not in BC1(X) is
equivalent to a certain countable Boolean combination of open sets in a completely
metrizable space being nonempty. Let Z be the set of all sequences
((fk,i : i <∞) : k <∞)
such that, for each k, (fk,i : i < ∞) is a sequence of continuous functions which
converges pointwise to an element of F . We will regard Z as being a product of
discrete spaces, noting that with this topology, Z is completely metrizable.
Observe that if g is a limit point of F which is not in BC1(X), then by Baire’s
characterization, there are rational numbers p < q, sets A := {ak : k < ∞},
B := {bk : k <∞}, and {fk : k <∞} ⊆ F such that:
(15) A and B are contained in X , have no isolated points, and have the same
closures;
(16) if k < l, then fl(ak) < p < q < fl(bk).
Moreover, one can select sequences (fk,i : i <∞) of continuous functions such that
fk,i → fk pointwise for each k. Thus we have that for every k < l there is an n
such that if n < j, then fl,j(ak) < p < q < fl,j(bk). It follows that there exist
((ak : k <∞), (bk : k <∞), ((fk,i : i <∞) : k <∞))
in Xω×Xω×Z specifying objects with the above properties if and only if F has an
accumulation point outside of BC1(X). Notice however, that these properties define
a countable Boolean combination of open subsets of Xω × Xω × Z and therefore
the theorem follows from Proposition 11.7. 
14. σ-closed forcings
There are two basic aspects of a forcing which are of fundamental importance
in understanding its properties: how large are its families of pairwise incompatible
elements and how frequently do directed families have lower bounds. Properties of
the former type are often referred to loosely as chain conditions ; we have already
seen the most important of these in Section 8. Properties of the latter type are
known as closure properties of a forcing. In this section, we will discuss the simplest
and most important example of a closure property.
Definition 14.1 (σ-closed). A forcing Q is σ-closed if whenever (qn : n <∞) is a
≤-decreasing sequence of elements of Q, there is a q¯ in Q such that q¯ ≤ qn for all
n.
It is perhaps worth remarking that any forcing which is σ-closed and atomless
(i.e. every element has two incompatible extensions), necessarily has an antichain
of cardinality of the continuum and so in particular is not c.c.c.. Like c.c.c. forc-
ings, however, σ-closed forcings also preserve uncountability, although for a quite
different reason.
Proposition 14.2. Suppose that Q is a σ-closed forcing. If f˙ is a Q-name and
p ∈ Q forces that f˙ is a function with domain ω, then there is a q ≤ p and a
function g such that q  f˙ = gˇ. In particular 1  ℵ˙1 = ℵˇ1 and 1  R˙ = Rˇ.
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Proof. Let p and f˙ be given as in the statement of the proposition. By repeatedly
appealing to Property 4, recursively construct a sequence of conditions (pn : n <∞)
and values g(n) of a function g defined on ω such that for all n, pn+1 ≤ pn ≤ p and
pn  f˙(nˇ) = gˇ(nˇ).
Since Q is σ-closed, there is a q in Q such that q ≤ pn for all n. Thus by Proposition
5.2, it follows that
q  ∀n (f˙(n) = gˇ(n)).

We will now consider some examples. The first forcing provides a means for
forcing the Continuum Hypothesis over a given model of set theory, complementing
the discussion at the end of Section 8.
Example 14.3. Let Q denote the collection of all countable partial functions from
ω1 to R, ordered by extension. Let g˙ be the Q-name for the union of the generic
filter. It is easily verified that Q forces that g˙ is defined on all of ωˇ1 and maps
ωˇ1 onto Rˇ. Furthermore, if (qn : n < ∞) is a descending sequence of conditions,
then
⋃∞
n=0 qn is a condition: it is a function and its domain is countable, being a
countable union of countable sets. Thus Q is σ-closed and hence forces that R˙ = Rˇ
and ℵ˙1 = ℵˇ1. Hence Q forces that |R˙| = ℵ˙1 (i.e. that the Continuum Hypothesis
is true).
Example 14.4. Consider the forcing ([ω]ω,⊂). This forcing is neither separative
nor σ-closed. The separative quotient is obtained by identifying sets a and b which
have a finite symmetric difference. If we define a ⊆∗ b to mean that a \ b is finite,
then ⊆∗ induces the order on the separative quotient. If (An : n < ∞) is a ⊆∗-
decreasing sequence of infinite subsets of ω, let nk be the least element of
⋂
i≤k Ai
which is greater than ni for each i < k. Notice that B := {ni : i < ∞} is an
infinite set and that {ni : i ≥ k} is a subset of Ak. Thus B ⊆
∗ Ak for all k. This
shows that the separative quotient is σ-closed. Notice that, by Ramsey’s theorem,
if f : [ω]d → 2, then
{q ∈ [ω]ω : f ↾ [q]d is constant}
is dense in [ω]ω (here [A]d denotes the d-element subsets of A). Since the separative
quotient of [ω]ω is σ-closed, forcing with it does not add new subsets of ω. Thus
it forces that G˙ is a Ramsey ultrafilter on ω: if f : [ω]d → 2 is a coloring of the
d-element subsets of ω, there is an H in the ultrafilter such that f is constant on
the d-element subsets of H . Kunen has shown, on the other hand, that whenever
θ > 2ℵ0 , Rθ forces that there does not exist a Ramsey ultrafilter on ω [15]. (Kunen
actually proved this in the special case in which the ground model satisfies the
Continuum Hypothesis. The general case follows by an absoluteness argument —
forcing with the poset Q of the previous example does not change the truth of “Rθ
forces that there are no Ramsey ultrafilters on ω”.)
We are now in a position to derive another property of Rosenthal compacta.
The proof below is a reproduction of Todorcevic’s proof in [27]; the result itself was
originally proved by Bourgain [4] using classical methods.
Theorem 14.5. If K is a Rosenthal compactum, then K contains a dense set of
points with a countable neighborhood base.
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Proof. Observe that it is sufficient to show that every Rosenthal compactum con-
tains a point with a countable base. Recall the following result of Cˇech and Posˇpisil
[32]: if K is a compact topological space of cardinality at most ℵ1, then K contains
a point with a countable neighborhood base. Let Q be the forcing from the previous
example. We have seen that Q forces that |R˙| = ℵ˙1 and hence that the collection
of all real valued Borel functions on a given Polish space has cardinality ℵ1. In
particular, Q forces that any Rosenthal compactum has cardinality ℵ1.
Now, let K be a Rosenthal compactum consisting of Baire class 1 functions on
some Polish space X . By Theorem 13.5, Q forces that the closure of Kˇ inside of
RX still consists only of Baire class 1 functions. Since Q is σ-closed, it follows that
1 forces that Kˇ is closed and hence a compact space of cardinality ℵ1. Therefore
by the Cˇech-Posˇpisil Theorem, there are Q-names g˙ and U˙n for each n such that 1
forces that g˙ is an element of Kˇ and that {U˙n : n <∞} is a countable neighborhood
base for g˙ consisting of basic open sets. Since Q is σ-closed, there is a q in Q which
decides g˙ to be some f and U˙n to be some Vn for each n. It follows that {Vn : n <∞}
is a countable neighborhood base. 
15. Mathias reals and a theorem of Galvin and Prikry
In this section we will give a forcing proof of the Galvin-Prikry Theorem, which
is an infinite dimensional form of Ramsey’s Theorem:
Theorem 15.1. [8] If X ⊆ [ω]ω is Borel, then there is an H ∈ [ω]ω such that
either [H ]ω ⊆ X or else [H ]ω ∩ X = ∅.
Recall that Mathias forcing M consists of all pairs p = (ap, Ap) such that Ap is
an infinite subset of ω and ap is a finite initial segment of Ap. The order on M is
such that q extends p if ap is an initial part of aq and Aq ⊆ Ap. A Mathias real is
a subset X of ω such that
GX := {p ∈M : ap ⊆ X ⊆ Ap}
is a generic filter. If D is a collection of subsets of M, then we say that X is
D-generic if GX is D-generic. If D ⊆ M, we will say that X is D-generic if it
is {D}-generic. We say that D ⊆ M is dense above n if whenever p ∈ M and
n ≤ min(ap), p has an extension in D.
Lemma 15.2. Suppose that D ⊆ M is dense above n. There is a dense set of H
in ([ω]ω ,⊆) such that any infinite subset of H is D-generic.
Proof. Let D and n be given as in the statement of the lemma and let A ⊆ ω be
arbitrary with n < min(A). Construct a sequence of infinite subsets Hk ⊆ A for
each k such that, setting nk := min(Hk):
(17) H0 := A and Hk+1 ⊆ Hk;
(18) nk < nk+1;
(19) for each x ⊆ {ni : i < k} either there is a p ∈ D such that ap = x and
Hk ⊆ Ap or else whenever p ∈ D with ap = x, Ap ∩Hk is finite.
Define B := {nk : k <∞} and set
F := {x ∈ [B]<ω : ∃p ∈ D((ap = x) and (Ap ⊆ B))}.
By Theorem 4.1, there is an infinite H ⊆ B such that either H has no subset in
F or else every infinite subset of H has an initial segment in F . Since (∅, H) is in
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M, it has an extension p in D. Since ap ⊆ Ap ⊆ H ⊆ B, ap is a subset of H in F .
Thus every infinite subset of H has an initial segment in F and n ≤ min(H).
Now let X be an infinite subset of H and x is an initial part of X in F . Let k be
such that x ⊆ {ni : i < k} and let p ∈ D be such that x = ap ⊆ Ap ⊆ B. Observe
that in particular Ap ∩Hk is infinite. Thus by our construction, Hk ⊆ Aq for some
q ∈ D such that aq = x. Now we have that aq ⊆ X ⊆ Aq and therefore that X is
D-generic. 
Proposition 15.3. Suppose that D is a countable collection of dense subsets of
M. For every x ∈ [ω]<ω there is a dense set of H in [ω]ω such that if X ⊆ H is
infinite then x ∪X is D-generic.
Proof. Let D and x be given as in the statement of the proposition. Fix an enu-
meration {Dk : k <∞} of D and let A ∈ [ω]ω be arbitrary with max(x) < min(A).
If y is a finite set and k <∞, define
Dk,y := {p ∈M : (max(y) < min(ap)) and ((y ∪ ap, y ∪ Ap) ∈ Dk)}.
Observe that Dk,y is dense above max(y)+1 and if X ⊆ ω with max(y) < min(X),
then y ∪X is Dk-generic if X is Dk,y-generic.
Using Lemma 15.2, construct infinite sets {Hk : k <∞} so that:
(20) H0 := A and Hk+1 ⊆ Hk;
(21) setting nk := min(Hk), we have nk < nk+1;
(22) any infinite subset of Hk is Dj,y-generic whenever j < k and x ⊆ y ⊆
x ∪ {ni : i < k}.
Define H := {nk : k <∞} and suppose that X is an infinite subset of H . Let k be
given and set y := x ∪ (X ∩ {ni : i < k}). Since X ∩ Hk = X \ x is Dk,y-generic,
x ∪X is Dk-generic. Thus H satisfies the conclusion of the proposition. 
If p, q ∈ M, then we say that q is a pure extension of p if q ≤ p and ap = aq.
The following proposition is central to the analysis of M and related posets.
Proposition 15.4. If φ is a formula in the forcing language and p ∈ M, p has a
pure extension which decides φ.
Proof. Let p and φ be given as in the statement of the proposition. Define D to
be the set of all conditions in M which decide φ, noting that D is dense. By
Proposition 15.3, there is an infinite B ⊆ Ap such that if X ⊆ B is infinite, then
ap ∪X is D-generic. Set
F := {x ∈ [B]<ω : ∃p ∈M((p  φ) and (ap = x) and (Ap ⊆ B))}.
By Theorem 4.1 there is an infinite H ⊆ B such that either H has no subset in F
or else every infinite subset of H has an initial part in F . If the first conclusion is
true, then (ap, H) forces ¬φ. If the second conclusion is true, then (ap, H) forces
φ. 
Since every Borel set is universally Baire by Proposition 11.6, the next theorem
implies the Galvin-Prikry Theorem [8].
Theorem 15.5. If X ⊆ [ω]ω is universally Baire, then there is an H ∈ [ω]ω such
that either [H ]ω ⊆ X or else [H ]ω ∩ X = ∅.
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Proof. Since X is universally Baire, there is anM-name X˙ , countably many dense
sets D, and a name X˙ for the Mathias real such that if G is a D-generic filter, then
X˙(G) ∈ X if and only if there is a p ∈ G such that p  X˙ ∈ X˙ if and only if there is
no p ∈ G such that p  X˙ 6∈ X˙ . By Proposition 15.4, there is condition of the form
(∅, A) which decides X˙ ∈ X˙ . By Proposition 15.3, there is an H ∈ [A]ω such that
every infinite subset of H is D-generic. It follows that H satisfies the conclusion of
the theorem. 
16. When compacta have dense metrizable subspaces*
Suppose thatK is a compact Hausdorff space. In this section we will reformulate
the question of when K contains a dense metrizable subspace in terms of the lan-
guage of forcing. Recall that every compact Hausdorff space is homeomorphic to a
closed subspace of [0, 1]I for some index set I. In this section, when we reinterpret
K in a generic extension, we will take K˙ to be the name for the closure of Kˇ in
[0, 1]Iˇ .
Recall that a regular pair in K is a pair (F,G) such that F and G are disjoint
closed Gδ subsets of K. If Ξ is an ordered set and ((Fξ, Gξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ) is a sequence
of regular pairs, then we say that ((Fξ, Gξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ) is a free sequence if whenever
A,B ⊆ Ξ are finite and satisfy max(A) < min(B), it follows that⋂
ξ∈A
Gξ ∩
⋂
ξ∈B
Fξ 6= ∅.
Recall also that a collection B of nonempty open subsets of K is a π-base if every
nonempty open set in K contains an element of B.
We note the following result of Todorcevic.
Theorem 16.1. [26] If K is any compact Hausdorff space, there is a sequence
((Fξ, Gξ) : ξ ∈ Π) of regular pairs in K such that {int(Gξ) : ξ ∈ Π} forms a π-
base for K of minimum cardinality and such that whenever Ξ ⊆ Π satisfies that
{Gξ : ξ ∈ Ξ} has the finite intersection property, ((Fξ, Gξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ) is a free
sequence.
The following result is implicit in [27] and is a key component in Todorcevic’s
proof that every Rosenthal compactum contains a dense metrizable subspace. Let
QK denote the forcing consisting of all nonempty open subsets of K ordered so
that q < p means that the closure of q is contained in p. We will let x˙G denote
the QK-name for the unique element of the intersection of G˙, when regarded as a
collection of open sets.
Theorem 16.2. Suppose that K is a compact Hausdorff space and ((Fξ , Gξ) :
ξ ∈ Π) is a sequence satisfying the conclusion of Theorem 16.1. The following are
equivalent:
a. K has a σ-disjoint π-base.
b. QK forces that x˙G has a countable neighborhood base.
c. QK forces that |{ξ ∈ Πˇ : Gˇξ ∈ G˙}| ≤ ℵ0.
Proof. To see that (a) implies (b), first observe that if U is a π-base for the topology
on K, then U is dense as a subset of QK . Hence QK forces that Uˇ ∩ G˙ generates
G. Also, if O is a pairwise disjoint family of open sets, then it is forced that
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|Oˇ ∩ G˙| ≤ 1. Hence if U is a σ-disjoint π-base, then it is forced that Uˇ ∩ G˙ is a
countable neighborhood base of x˙G.
The equivalence between (b) and (c) follows from the fact that
{Gξ : (ξ ∈ Π) and (x˙G ∈ Gξ)}
is forced to be a neighborhood base for x˙G and that
{(Fξ, Gξ) : (ξ ∈ Π) and (x˙G ∈ Gξ)}
is a free sequence and hence no smaller neighborhood base can suffice.
Finally, to see that (c) implies (a), suppose that every condition forces that
|{ξ ∈ Πˇ : Gˇξ ∈ G˙}| ≤ ℵ0. Let (ξ˙n : n < ∞) be a sequence of QK-names such that
every condition of QK forces that
{ξ˙n : n <∞} = {ξ ∈ Πˇ : x˙G ∈ Gˇξ}.
Let On be a maximal antichain in QK such that elements of On decide ξ˙n and set
U :=
⋃∞
n=0On. Clearly U is σ-disjoint; it suffices to show that it is a π-base. To
see this, suppose that V is a nonempty open subset of K. Let p be a nonempty
regular open subset of V and let n˙ be such that p forces that Gˇξ˙n˙ ⊆ Vˇ . Now let
U be an element of U which decides ξ˙n˙ to be ξ. Notice that we must have that
U ⊆ Gξ ⊆ V . 
Recall that a topological space X is countably tight if whenever A ⊆ X and
x ∈ cl(A), there is a countable A0 ⊆ A such that x ∈ cl(A0). It is easy to show that
continuous images of countably tight spaces are countably tight. It is well known
that in the class of compact Hausdorff spaces, countable tightness is equivalent to
the nonexistence of uncountable free sequences of regular pairs. We now have the
following corollary.
Corollary 16.3. Let P be a forcing. If K is compact, contains a dense first
countable subspace, and
1 P K˙ is countably tight
then K contains a dense metrizable subspace.
Proof. By our assumption and Theorem 16.2, K has a σ-disjoint π-base and thus
so does the dense first countable subspace. By a result of H.E. White [33], any
first countable Hausdorff space with a σ-disjoint π-base has a dense metrizable
subspace. 
An immediate consequence of the results we have developed so far is the fol-
lowing result of Todorcevic. Previously it had not been known whether there were
nonseparable Rosenthal compacta which had no uncountable family of pairwise dis-
joint open sets or whether certain specific Rosenthal compacta had dense metrizable
subspaces (see the discussion in [27]).
Theorem 16.4. [27] Rosenthal compacta contain dense metrizable subspaces.
Proof. Let K be a Rosenthal compactum and let K˜ be the QK-name for the rein-
terpretation of K as a Rosenthal compactum in the generic extension by QK . By
Theorem 14.5, K contains a dense first countable subspace. By Theorem 13.5, QK
forces that K˜ is a Rosenthal compactum and hence is countably tight by Theorem
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13.3. Since K˙, as defined in the beginning of this section, is a continuous projec-
tion of K˜, it follows that K˙ is forced to be countably tight. By Corollary 16.3, K
contains a dense metrizable subspace. 
17. Further reading
As was mentioned earlier, Kunen’s book [16] is a good next step if one is inter-
ested in further reading on forcing. It also contains a large number of exercises.
Chapters VII and VIII provide a standard treatment of forcing, presented with
a more semantic orientation, and Chapter II provides some useful background on
combinatorial set theory.
Further reading on forcings which add a single real — such as C,R,M, Aǫ — can
be found in [3]. Also, Laver’s work on the Borel Conjecture [18] is a significant early
paper on the subject which already contains important techniques in the modern
set theory such as countable support iteration. Zapletal’s [35] gives a different
perspective on forcings related to set theory of the reals.
For those who can find a copy, [31] is also good further reading on forcing and
provides a different perspective than [16]. Those readers who have studied the
material on Martin’s Axiom in [16, II,VIII] and/or forcing axioms in [31] are referred
to [20], [29], and [7] where this concept is further developed and the literature is
surveyed.
Solovay’s analysis of the model L(R) [25] is a landmark result in the study of
forcing and large cardinals. (Solovay actually analyzed a larger model than L(R),
but L(R) has since shown itself to be more fundamental and now bears the name
Solovay model.) At the same time, [25] should be accessible to readers who have
been through this article. A proof of Solovay’s theorem is reproduced in [13] which
is also a standard encyclopedic reference on large cardinals. See also Mathias’s
infinite dimensional generalization of Ramsey’s Theorem which holds in L(R) after
collapsing an appropriate large cardinal [19]. An explanation of the special role
Solovay’s model plays in the foundations of mathematics can be found in [23] [34].
[17] provides a good introduction to the methods needed to establish absoluteness
results about L(R).
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